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This paper applies stochastic simulation methods to assess debt sustainability in emerging 
market economies and provide probability measures for projections of the external and public 
debt burden over the medium term. The vulnerability of public debt to adverse shocks is 
determined by a number of inter-related factors, including the volatility of output, financial 
fragility, the endogenous response of the risk premium and sudden stops in private capital 
flows; the vulnerability of external debt is sensitive to the determination of the exchange rate 
and to the pricing of traded goods. We show that fiscal policy can act in a pre-emptive 
manner to prevent the debt burden from rising significantly over the medium term. This 
requires flexibility in fiscal planning, which many emerging market economies lack. 
Emerging market economies therefore face a difficult trade-off between managing the risk of 
a debt crisis and pursuing other important fiscal policy objectives. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Debt sustainability has played an increasingly important role in the analysis of 
macroeconomic policies in low- and middle-income countries. Debt sustainability 
assessments (DSAs) have become a standard element of IMF Article IV and program 
reviews. They play an integral role in Paris Club negotiations on debt rescheduling and figure 
prominently in determining the grant versus loan components of IDA14 allocations to low-
income countries.  
 
The standard DSA framework used by the IMF and the World Bank basically entails 
conducting stress tests with reference to a baseline projection scenario.
2 The baseline is 
intended to establish the most likely outcome conditional on underlying policies. Alternative 
projection scenarios include a set of standard adverse shocks, which typically include a 
transitory decrease in output growth, an increase in interest rates and a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, along with other shocks that are selected on a case-by-case basis. The stress 
tests have some important advantages, along with a few shortcomings. The DSA framework 
largely consists of accounting identities, with few economic (behavioral) relationships, and 
hence, the projections are generated by an underlying economic structure. Standardization of 
the shocks facilitates comparisons across countries and over time. The stress tests are 
therefore relatively straightforward to interpret from a technical perspective. However, they 
are difficult to interpret from an economic perspective. The accounting identities do not take 
into account interaction between economic variables. For instance, an interest rate shock has 
no effect on output or the exchange rate. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the likelihood of 
the alternative scenarios.  
 
Recent studies (notably by Barnhill and Kopits 2003, Garcia and Rigobon 2004, and 
Mendoza and Oviedo 2003) have applied stochastic simulation methods to develop a DSA 
framework that generates probability measures that take into account interaction between key 
economic variables. Our analysis includes a number of features that have not been examined 
in these studies. In particular, monetary and fiscal policy are set with reference to well-
defined objectives, implemented using forward-looking policy rules. Moreover, debt 
management plays a central role in our analysis. External and public debt have explicit 
maturity structures, and include a distinction between debt denominated in foreign versus 
domestic currency. Our model also allows for local versus producer pricing of traded goods, 
which has important implications for assessing the sustainability of external debt.  
 
Our paper is also motivated by the “debt intolerance” question posed by Reinhart, Rogoff 
and Savastano (2003). They point out that debt defaults have often occurred in emerging 
market economies with moderate debt levels and ask why emerging market economies have 
defaulted so often compared to advanced economies with comparable or even higher debt 
                                                 
2 This is documented in IMF (2002 and 2003). A similar framework has been adopted by the 
IMF and World Bank (2004a and 2004b) to assess debt sustainability in low-income 
countries. - 4 - 
burdens. What factors make emerging market economies more vulnerable to adverse shocks? 
Our stochastic simulation experiments are designed to provide some insight into these 
questions, drawing on several factors that have been proposed in the recent literature.
3 
 
We specify a stochastic simulation model that encompasses four key factors, namely 
macroeconomic volatility, financial fragility (reliance on short-term, foreign currency 
borrowing), the endogenous response of the risk premium and “sudden stops” in private 
capital flows. Stochastic simulation methods are used to examine how the factors interact to 
influence the amount of uncertainty surrounding external and public debt over the medium 
term. Our simulation results indicate that the factors listed above taken together make public 
debt in emerging market economies much more vulnerable to adverse shocks. The 
vulnerability of external debt is found to be sensitive to two model specification issues, 
namely the determination of the exchange rate and the pricing of traded goods. We examine 
the role of fiscal policy in managing default risk. Our simulations results demonstrate how 
fiscal policy can act in a pre-emptive manner to prevent the public debt burden from rising 
significantly over the medium term. However, this requires flexibility in fiscal planning, 
which many emerging market economies lack. We believe that this is an important aspect of 
the debt intolerance question posed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano. 
 
The next section of the paper reviews the literature on debt sustainability, highlighting some 
of the key factors that have been proposed to explain why emerging market economies are 
vulnerable to adverse shocks. Section III provides a brief overview of the basic structure of 
the stochastic simulation model and the methodology used to calibrate the parameters. 
Section IV presents the stochastic simulation results. The final section concludes by 
summarizing the main findings and commenting on areas for further research. 
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW  
A.   Debt Sustainability Assessments 
The DSA framework outlined in IMF (2002 and 2003) reports stress tests based on adverse 
shocks taken separately and simultaneously. The distinction between an isolated shock and 
several simultaneous shocks is quite important.  If shocks to output, interest rates and the 
exchange rate are independent, the joint likelihood of large adverse shocks would be 
relatively low, which would make the scenario “improbable”.  However, the IMF (2003, p. 
16) argues that adverse movements in output, interest rates and the exchange rate have 
tended to precede financial crises in emerging market economies. More generally, output, 
interest rates, the exchange rate and debt are believed to be jointly determined. Determining 
the joint likelihood of large adverse movements in these variables is essential for assessing 
debt sustainability. 
                                                 
3 This paper focuses on debt sustainability in emerging market economies, which refers to 
middle-income countries that access external private capital markets on a regular basis. IMF 
(2004) examines debt sustainability in low-income countries; Sun (2004) examines debt 
sustainability in HIPC countries. - 5 - 
 
A number of studies have applied stochastic simulation methods to quantify the joint 
probability aspect of DSAs. The basic methodology entails applying Monte Carlo simulation 
methods to a macroeconomic model that captures interaction between key variables 
(including output, interest rates, the exchange rate and debt). The simulations generate 
empirical probability distributions for each of the variables, which enables one to gauge the 
likelihood of a given outcome. In particular, stochastic simulation methods can provide a 
measure of the risk that the debt burden rises significantly over the medium term, a key issue 
in assessing debt sustainability. 
 
Different approaches have been taken to model the interaction between economic variables in 
stochastic simulation studies. Barnhill and Kopits (2003) apply the value at risk methodology 
to assess fiscal sustainability in a framework that takes into account co-variances between 
risk variables.  Garcia and Rigobon (2004) examine stochastic simulation experiments using 
a vector autoregression that captures correlation between macro variables. Mendoza and 
Oviedo (2003) apply stochastic simulation methods in a dynamic general equilibrium 
modeling framework where co-movement between macro variables is determined by an 
explicit theoretical structure. In a normative vein, Tanner and Carey (2005) discuss potential 
fiscal objective functions that might apply in a stochastic macroeconomic. Their value-at-risk 
objective function summarizes the maximum fiscal adjustment that a country is willing to 
incur in order to prevent further increases in debt – precisely the undesirable outcomes 
revealed by such stochastic simulations. Our analysis includes a number of features that have 
not been examined in these studies, including forward-looking monetary and fiscal policy 
rules, an explicit maturity structure and currency denomination for external and public debt, 
and a distinction between local- versus producer-pricing of traded goods. In addition, our 
analysis encompasses a number of key factors in a common framework to investigate how 
their interaction influences debt sustainability.  
 
B.   Factors Influencing Debt Sustainability 
The series of financial crises in emerging market economies over the past decade has led to 
vast empirical and theoretical literature.  Financial crises differ greatly in their causes and 
consequences. Empirical studies have shown that it is difficult to predict debt distress 
episodes with a reasonable amount of confidence. Nevertheless some common elements have 
emerged in this literature to help explain why emerging market economies are vulnerable to 
adverse shocks. This review highlights some of the key factors influencing debt 
sustainability, namely: macroeconomic volatility, financial fragility, endogenous risk 
premium, and sudden stops in capital flows.  
 
Macroeconomic volatility 
Macroeconomic volatility has often played a prominent role in debt distress episodes. 
Empirical studies by Catão and Sutton (2002) and Catão and Kapur (2004) indicate that 
countries with more volatile output and terms of trade and destabilizing macro policies are 
more likely to default on their sovereign debt. The terms of trade and output are much more 
volatile in emerging market economies than in advanced economies. Our calculations - 6 - 
indicate that the standard deviation of the terms of trade and output in emerging market 
economies is roughly double that observed in the major advanced (G7) economies.
4 Catão 
and Kapur (2004) argue that macroeconomic volatility is a key determinant of default risk 
and can help explain the debt intolerance question posed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano. 
 
Financial fragility 
Financial fragility attracted a great deal of attention in the wake of the Asian crisis in 1997-
98. Large exchange rate exposures in banking and corporate sectors made many of the Asian 
economies vulnerable to a large exchange rate devaluation (Chang and Velasco 1998, 
Radelet and Sachs 1998, and Hawkins and Turner 2000). The predominance of short-term, 
foreign currency denominated borrowing was a major factor underlying the liquidity crises. 
Emerging market economies are, to a great extent, unable to borrow at long maturities in 
domestic currency (the so-called “original sin” hypothesis)
5 and hence, must resort to issuing 
short-term foreign currency denominated debt (Hausmann 2004). Abrupt movements in 
interest rates and exchange rates therefore can have a major impact on the debt service 
burden, making these economies vulnerable to a debt crisis. 
 
Endogenous risk premium 
Interaction between the expectations of debtors and creditors play a critical role in assessing 
default risk, particularly for emerging market economies that are financially fragile. Sudden 
swings in investor sentiment can lead to an abrupt widening of yield spreads along with a 
large depreciation of the exchange rate, which can raise debt service costs and the debt 
burden (measured in domestic currency) significantly. The higher debt burden in turn raises 
the risk of debt default. Thus, the simultaneous interaction between creditors’ assessment of 
default risk, large movements in interest rates and the exchange rate, and the debt burden can 
greatly amplify the nonlinear aspect of debt dynamics. The endogenous response of the risk 
premium to changes in default risk therefore plays an important role in assessing debt 
sustainability. 
 
Several recent studies have examined the interaction between default risk, an endogenous 
risk premium and debt sustainability. Akemann and Kanczuk (2005) construct a model in 
                                                 
4 The terms of trade in emerging market economies has a standard deviation of about 20% on 
average over the period 1971-2004, versus 9% in the major advanced (G7) economies. GDP 
growth has a standard deviation of about 4.2% in emerging market economies, versus 2.2% 
for the major advanced economies. Unless stated otherwise, all calculations reported in this 
paper are based on a sample of 31 emerging market economies, which roughly corresponds 
to the economies included in the Institute of International Finance (IIF) analysis of capital 
flows to emerging market economies. 
5 There are a few notable exceptions recently. In October 2004, Uruguay issued the 
equivalent of about US$280 million in local currency (peso) denominated (2-year) bonds; In 
November 2004, Columbia issued the equivalent of US$380 million in local currency (peso) 
denominated (5.5-year) bonds. More recently, in September 2005 Brazil issued the 
equivalent of US$1.5 billion in real-denominated (10-year) bonds.   - 7 - 
which higher interest rates increase debt service costs, which worsens the fiscal outlook. 
Their model imposes a fiscal constraint on adjustment of the primary surplus, which makes 
the government “unable to repay” it debt obligations. Adverse shocks raise the probability 
that the fiscal constraint might bind at some point in the future. This raises the risk of debt 
default, which gets reflected in the risk premium. Dailami et al (2005) examine how changes 
in global (US) interest rates can affect default risk on emerging market bonds, which gets 
reflected in emerging market bond spreads. They stress that the relationship between global 
interest rates and default risk is nonlinear, and depends on the external debt burden. Arellano 
(2005) analyzes the government’s default decision based on explicit costs and benefits in the 
context of a stochastic general equilibrium open economy model that includes an endogenous 
default premium determined in a model-consistent manner. When the debt service burden 
exceeds a ‘threshold’ level in the model the government assesses that the costs of meeting its 
debt obligations outweigh the benefits. Blanchard (2004) constructs a model in which the risk 
premium and the exchange rate evolve endogenously with the probability of default. An 
increase in the real interest rate beyond some threshold level in the model increases default 
risk to the point where the risk-adjusted rate of return on public debt declines. This makes the 
government unable to compensate investors for the higher default risk and hence the 
government cannot issue new debt or refinance maturing debt. 
 
“Sudden stops” in capital flows 
Several studies have stressed that when the risk premium on external debt exceeds some 
threshold level, foreign investors become unwilling to lend and issuers become unwilling to 
borrow. Pescatori and Sy (2004) argue that market participants often view sovereign bond 
spreads above 1000 basis points as signaling significant probability of default, making it very 
difficult to access external credit. Pescatori and Sy present empirical evidence showing that 
emerging market economies experience severe financing difficulties when their bond spreads 
exceed 1,000 basis points.  
 
Several studies have emphasized that emerging market economies are prone to “sudden 
stops” in private capital inflows, which result in a loss of foreign reserves along with a 
sizeable real exchange depreciation required to improve the current account (notably Calvo 
1998 and Krugman 1999). Arellano and Mendoza (2002) characterize “sudden stop” 
episodes with reference to a set of empirical regularities which include: a sudden loss of 
access to international capital markets; a large improvement in the current account deficit; a 
collapse of domestic production and aggregate demand; sharp corrections in asset prices and 
in the prices of non-traded goods relative to traded goods, and sharp declines in credit to the 
private sector.  
 
Abrupt current account adjustments, often accompanied by sudden stops in capital flows, 
have played a prominent role in most of the major financial crises over the past decade.
6 
Sudden stops have often been highly disruptive, forcing costly adjustment and in some cases 
                                                 
6 Edwards (2004) points out that there have been large current account reversals without 
sudden stops in capital flows and vice versa, indicating that some countries have been able to 
draw down foreign reserves to prevent abrupt adjustment in the current account. - 8 - 
have led to episodes of debt distress. Calculations reported by Calvo (2003) indicate that the 
capital account / GDP declined by 11 percentage points on average in 15 financial crises that 
occurred over the period 1981-1997 (Table 1, p. 3).
7 In many cases, episodes of sudden stops 
and abrupt current account reversals were accompanied by currency crises, involving large 
exchange rate devaluations along with large reductions of foreign reserves.
8 We abstract 
from foreign reserve management in our analysis and hence, treat sudden stops in capital 
flows and abrupt current account adjustment as being synonymous. A number of empirical 
studies have examined the adjustment costs caused by sharp reversals in current account 
balances but the results are mixed.
9 
 
A number of theoretical models have been developed to explain the sudden stop 
phenomenon.
10 Calvo (2003) constructs a model in which the government’s capacity to raise 
tax revenues is limited by the distortionary effect of taxes on growth. This creates a threshold 
level for tax rates, which constrains the ability of the government to respond to adverse 
shocks. The debt solvency condition is violated when the revenue financing constraint binds. 
Arellano and Mendoza (2002) and Mendoza (2005) incorporate financial-frictions channels 
into a small open economy equilibrium business cycle model. They show that occasionally-
binding borrowing constraints can yield infrequent sudden stops in capital flows, large 
reversals in the current account and deep recessions.   
 
To sum up, several factors have been proposed in the literature to explain the vulnerability of 
emerging market economies to adverse shocks. Macroeconomic policy has played an 
important role as a destabilizing force, as have volatile output and terms of trade shocks. 
Financial fragility is also believed to play a key role: short-term, foreign-currency borrowing 
makes emerging market economies vulnerable to large movements in interest rates and 
exchange rates. The endogenous response of the risk premium to adverse shocks and the 
possibility of sudden stops in capital flows accentuate the non-linear aspect of debt dynamics. 
                                                 
7 Similarly, calculations reported by Hostland and Schembri (2005) indicate that the current 
account/GDP improved by about ten percentage points on average in the year following 11 
major financial crises that occurred over the period 1995-2001.  
 
8 Calvo et al (2004) found that 63% of the large exchange rate depreciations in their sample 
of emerging market economies were associated with sudden stop episodes. Statistical 
analysis by Edwards (2004) indicates that countries subject to large current account reversals 
have a significant probability of a major devaluation. 
9 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), Debelle and Galati (2005) and Croke et al (2005) 
conclude that sharp reversals are not systematically related to slowdowns in growth, whereas 
Freund and Warnock (2005) found large significant effects. Edwards (2004), Calvo et al 
(2004), and Frankel and Cavallo (2004) show that the adjustment costs are lower in more 
open economies (measured by exports plus imports relative to GDP). 
10 See Arellano and Mendoza (2002) for a more extensive survey of the literature on sudden 
stops. - 9 - 
It is important to recognize that the factors outlined above are inter-related. Our stochastic 
simulation model is designed to nest these factors in a common framework so that we can 
examine how they interact to influence debt sustainability.   
 
Recent Trends  
Much of the existing literature on debt sustainability has focused on external debt. This is 
mainly because there hasn’t been an active market for domestic debt in most emerging 
market economies until recently and also because data on domestic debt are not readily 
available in most countries. Various indicators suggest that most emerging market economies 
have become less vulnerable to an external debt crisis since the Asian crisis in 1997-98 and 
the Russian crisis in 1998. There have been numerous credit rating upgrades over the past 
few years; emerging market bond spreads have declined to record lows. The major 
improvement in assessments of creditworthiness reflects a combination of factors, including 
favorable external conditions (low global interest rates in particular), improvements in 
macroeconomic policies in most emerging market economies, and progress on structural 
reforms in some countries. 
 
The average external debt burden in middle-income countries has declined from 44% of GNI 
in 1999 to 38% in 2003, but remains well above the average level of 33.7% over the period 
1982-1998 (Table 1).
11 At the same time, emerging market economies have become much 
more open—exports in middle-income countries have increased from 31.6% of GNI in 1999 
to 39% in 2003, well above the average level of 22% over the period 1982-1998. There has 
also been a major swing in the current account from a balanced position in 1999 to a surplus 
equal to 1.5% of GDP in 2003, well above an average deficit at 1.2% of GDP over the period 
1982-1998. In addition, foreign reserves have increased from 31% of GNI in 1999 to 52% in 
2003, well above the average level of 20.5% of GDP over the period 1982-98. Taken 
together, the developments outlined above make emerging market economies much better 
placed to weather adverse shocks to external debt. 
 
 
                                                 
11 The external debt burden averaged across all developing countries (low- and middle-
income countries combined) declined from 45% of GNI in 1999 to 35% in 2004 (World 
Bank 2005, p. 2). - 10 - 
Table 1. Balance of payment indicators for middle-income countries 
py
  Percent
Average       
1982-1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
  External debt / GNI 33.7 44.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 38.0
  Exports / GNI 22.1 31.6 34.7 34.0 36.2 38.8
  Trade balance / GNI -1.3 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.9 1.3
  Current account balance / GNI -1.2 0.0 0.7 0.2 1.1 1.5
 External debt / Exports of goods and services 156.1 139.0 113.0 114.0 108.0 99.0
 Reserves / External debt  20.5 31.0 33.0 37.0 44.0 52.0
Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System (DRS) database.  
 
There is, however, a concern that public debt burdens have risen in some emerging market 
economies over the past few years, spurred by the development of domestic debt markets 
(World Bank 2005, pp. 76-80). Our calculations indicate that the public debt burden in 31 
emerging market economies increased from an average level of 53.6% of GDP in 2000 to 
58.6% in 2003, before declining slightly to 55.8% in 2004.
12 Moreover, in 12 of the 31 
countries in our sample, public debt burdens increased over the period 2002-04, despite the 
favorable external conditions. In 2004, public debt burdens exceeded 80% of GDP in 5 of the 
31 countries. We will explore how the increase in public debt burdens in some emerging 
market economies has affected their vulnerability to adverse shocks. 
 
III.   OVERVIEW OF STOCHASTIC SIMULATION MODEL 
This section of the paper highlights some of the key features of the model that play an 
important role in the results.
13 The macroeconomic core model consists of a few reduced-
form equations for aggregate demand/supply dynamics and the inflation process.  Ideally, we 
would prefer to have an underlying structure with more explicit microfoundations.  Our 
preference for a small, aggregate model is largely determined by computational requirements 
of stochastic simulation methods. In addition, the reduced-form specification greatly 
facilitates calibration of the parameters. The model presented in this paper should be 
interpreted as an early stage of a broader research agenda that aims to develop stochastic 
simulation models based on more explicit structural interpretations. We will return to this 
issue at the end of the paper.
  
 
Most stochastic simulation models are calibrated with reference to historical data. IMF 
(2003, p. 21) argues that this can be a major drawback because of “the lack of sufficient data 
or stable time series for many countries”. We address this concern by adopting a calibration 
methodology that is less susceptible to poor data quality. Rather than relying on estimates 
                                                 
12 These calculations are based on data compiled for the September 2005 IMF World 
Economic Outlook.  
13 For a more detailed discussion of the stochastic simulation model and the calibration 
methodology, see Hostland and Karam (forthcoming, 2005).  - 11 - 
specific to a particular country, our model is calibrated to match broad stylized facts that are 
common across a large set of emerging market economies.
14 In addition, we impose our 
priors on certain aspects of the model to address some of the problems caused by unstable 
time series properties of the data. For instance, monetary policy in our model is set using an 
inflation targeting rule, which does not correspond with how monetary policy was set in most 
economies over most of the historical period. The time series properties of inflation 
generated by our model are therefore significantly different from those observed over the 
historical period (particularly in those emerging market economies that have experienced 
episodes of hyperinflation), as they are calibrated to be consistent with an inflation targeting 
environment. As a consequence, our stochastic simulation results should be interpreted as 
being conditional on a credible inflation targeting regime.  
 
Some equations in the model are specified on theoretical grounds. For example, the exchange 
rate is determined by the uncovered interest parity condition and the term structure of interest 
rates is modeled using the expectations hypothesis. In both cases, expectations are formed by 
combining backward- and forward-looking components, so as to encompass purely adaptive 
and fully rational (model-consistent) expectations as two extremes. Other parameters in the 
model are calibrated to match selected moments of the data. This entails setting parameters 
such that the variances and autocorrelation coefficients simulated by the model correspond as 
close as possible to those observed in the data. For instance, in the case of uncovered interest 
parity condition, the forward- and backward-looking components of expected exchange rate 
changes are combined such that the variance and autocorrelation of exchange rate changes 
simulated by the model match those in the data. 
 
Some parameters are calibrated in a more subjective manner. In the case of inflation, the 
monetary policy authority in the model aims to keep inflation within a target range using a 
forward-looking reaction function. This entails setting its instrument – the short-term 
nominal interest rate – each quarter so as to bring inflation back to the target level over the 
coming year or two (depending on the nature of the shock). The parameters are calibrated to 
be consistent with the low and stable inflation environment that emerged in the early 1990s 
in most advanced countries. The model generates fluctuations in inflation that are 
substantially smaller than those observed in the data prior to the 1990s, especially in the case 
of those emerging market economies that experienced episodes of hyperinflation. This has 
implications for all nominal variables in the model (such as nominal output, interest rates and 
the exchange rate).  
 
It is important to recognize that the objective of our analysis is not to explain the data over 
the historical period, but rather to assess the risks going forward conditional on explicit 
policies. For the purposes of this paper, we gauge the risks facing a “generic” emerging 
market economy conditional on monetary and fiscal policy rules that are designed to attain 
well-defined objectives. The monetary authority’s objective is defined with reference to an 
inflation target; the fiscal authority’s objective is defined with reference to a debt target. The 
                                                 
14 For a more detailed discussion of estimation versus calibration approaches to specifying 
macro models, see Berg, Karam and Laxton (2005) and the references therein. - 12 - 
stochastic simulation results therefore must be interpreted as conditional on credible 
monetary and fiscal policy regimes. 
 
The fiscal authority in the model seeks to prevent the public debt burden from rising 
significantly over the medium term. This is implemented using an endogenous reaction 
function. The fiscal authority responds to adverse shocks by reducing discretionary spending 
to ensure that the projected public debt burden reverts to its initial level over the medium 
term. There is feedback between the fiscal policy measures undertaken and aggregate 
demand. Aggregate demand shocks impinge on the primary fiscal balance and on debt 
service costs. The fiscal policy response to unanticipated fiscal developments in turn affects 
aggregate demand. The interaction between policy changes and economic developments are 
solved simultaneously using model-consistent expectations. Later in the paper we examine 
the implications of alternative fiscal policy rules.  
 
External debt also plays a prominent role in the model. The trade sector includes price and 
volume equations. In the benchmark specification of the model 90% of exports and imports 
are priced in foreign currency; the remaining 10% are priced in domestic currency.
15 This 
trade pricing assumption has a major influence on some of our results.  The model also 
includes valuation effects on debt stocks.  All external debt is denominated in foreign 
currency whereas only half of public debt is denominated in foreign currency.
16 External debt 
is therefore more vulnerable to a large exchange rate depreciation. The maturity structure of 
debt also plays an important role in our analysis. Public debt has a much shorter average term 
to maturity than external debt, making public debt service more susceptible to large increases 
in interest rates. These differences in debt management have an impact on the vulnerability 
of public and external debt to adverse interest rate and exchange rate shocks. 
 
Modeling default risk 
We do not include episodes of debt default in our stochastic simulation framework because it 
would require specifying a rule for writing down the value of debt. In principal, the size of 
the write-down should be determined with reference to the “sustainable” level of debt. It is 
not clear how to define “debt sustainability” in a probabilistic framework. We leave this for 
future research.  
 
The debt solvency condition is not violated in the simulations presented in this paper. The 
trade balance in our model adjusts to ensure that the present discounted value of future trade 
balances exceeds the value of external debt. Similarly, the fiscal authority is able to adjust 
discretionary spending to ensure that the solvency condition for public debt is satisfied. This 
                                                 
15 This is supported by empirical evidence documented by Hostland and Schembri (2005). 
16 The model is calibrated such that 38% of public debt is issued externally (denominated in 
foreign currency), while another 12% is issued domestically (denominated in local currency), 
but indexed to the exchange rate. IMF (p. 17, 2005) estimates that the proportion of public 
debt denominated in foreign currency domestic has declined from 55% at end-2002 to under 
half at end-2005. - 13 - 
assumes that the government has sufficient room to make changes in discretionary spending 
without having to raise taxes or cut non-discretionary spending.  We also abstract from 
longer-term growth implications of raising distortionary taxes (Calvo et al 2003 and Calvo 
2003) or cutting public infrastructure spending. Instead of setting an explicit fiscal constraint 
(as in Mendoza and Oviedo 2003 and Hausmann 2004), we generate probability distributions 
for the primary fiscal balance to gauge the amount of fiscal effort required to keep the public 
debt burden from rising significantly.   
 
Investors in the model gauge the risk of default with reference to the debt burden projected 
over the coming year using model-consistent expectations. When the debt burden rises above 
the initial level, investors demand a higher risk premium to compensate for the higher 
probability of debt default at some point in the future. The fiscal plan is credible in the sense 
that the model-consistent expectations can be derived under the fiscal policy rule. However, 
investors are uncertain about whether the fiscal authority might become unable or unwilling 
to repay in the event of subsequent adverse shocks. The increase in default risk also leads to 
an exchange rate depreciation (along the lines of Blanchard 2004).  This has two opposing 
effects. The valuation effect refers to the higher value of the debt that is denominated in 
foreign currency, which raises debt service payments. This is more than offset by the 
improvement in the trade balance. On balance, the exchange rate response stabilizes the 
external sector and thereby limits the amount of volatility in the current account and the 
external debt burden. The magnitude of the exchange rate response is calibrated such that the 
amount of volatility generated by the model matches that observed in the data.
17  
 
We also incorporate sudden stops in capital flows into the model.  This is implemented by 
imposing a ceiling on the risk premium. The ceiling is set at a level (800 basis points) where 
the sudden stop constraint binds occasionally.
18 When this constraint binds, the exchange rate 
depreciates discretely which leads to a rapid improvement in the current account and a sharp 
decline in capital flows.
19 The endogenous risk premium and sudden stop in capital flows 
reinforce one another, accentuating the nonlinearity in debt dynamics 
 
                                                 
17 The exchange rate response is calibrated such that there is a 10% probability that the 
external debt burden generated by the model will increase by 9.5 percentage points over a 
five-year period, which is equal to the average outcome for the G7 countries over the period 
1975-2003 calculated using the data on net international investment positions compiled by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005). 
18 The unconditional probability of a sudden stop is between 4% and 7% in the simulations 
reported in the paper. This range matches the incidence of sudden stops calculated by 
Edwards (Table 19, 2004) for the following regions: Asia (3.9%), Latin America and 
Caribbean (4.5%), Africa (6.9%) and Eastern Europe (7.1%).  
19 Our analysis abstracts from the use of foreign reserves and official financing in the event 
of a sudden stop in capital flows. - 14 - 
IV.   STOCHASTIC SIMULATION RESULTS 
The stochastic simulation framework nests a number of features that make emerging market 
economies vulnerable to adverse shocks. We present simulation results with reference to a 
“benchmark” specification of the model that is calibrated to match empirical regularities 
observed in advanced countries. We then sequentially add features to the model to show how 
each in turn influences debt sustainability. 
  
A.   Benchmark Specification for Advanced Countries 
To simplify our analysis we begin by setting the implicit interest rate of debt (r) equal to the 
economic growth rate (g) in the benchmark specification. This results in a steady state 
growth rate equilibrium where the trade balance and primary fiscal balance are both zero. 
The advanced country does not pay a risk premium on external or public debt. All of external 
and public debt is denominated in domestic currency. Each of these assumptions will be 
relaxed later when we examine simulations for emerging market economies. 
The external debt burden is set to an initial level at 32% of GDP.
20 Trade is initially 
balanced; debt service payments amount to 1.6% of GDP, implying a current account deficit 
at the same level.  The public debt burden is initially set at 55% of GDP.
21 The overall 
government budget is initially in balance; debt service payments amount to 2.7% of GDP, 
equal to the primary fiscal deficit. The initial conditions characterize the stock-flow steady-
state equilibrium of the fiscal and external sectors of the model in the absence of stochastic 
shocks.  
 
Stochastic simulations involve the following sequence of events. At the beginning of each 
quarter, the monetary and fiscal authorities in the model set their policy instruments. 
Stochastic shocks then arrive and displace all endogenous variables. The monetary and fiscal 
authorities revise their policy setting in the following quarter, taking into account the 
unanticipated developments resulting from the stochastic shocks. The simulations continue 
over a five-year time horizon, which corresponds to the IMF DSA framework (IMF 2002 and 
2003). The five-year stochastic simulation runs are repeated 10,000 times, resulting in 50,000 
annual simulation values for each endogenous variable. This enables us to generate 
probability distributions with fairly good precision. 
 
The model and shocks are symmetric and hence, probability distributions for all simulated 
variables are centered on their respective mean (steady-state) values. This is illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2 which show 80% confidence intervals for four variables of interest: the trade 
balance, external debt, the primary fiscal balance, and public debt, each measured as a 
percent of GDP. The confidence interval for external debt / GDP widens over a five-year 
                                                 
20 This is estimated to be the average level for middle-income countries in 2004, based on 
World Bank DRS data. 
21 This is the average level for 31 emerging market economies in 2004, based on data 
compiled for the September 2005 IMF World Economic Outlook. - 15 - 
projection horizon, such that 80% of the outcomes in the 5
th year fall within the 22.6% to 
41.4% range, centered on the steady-state level of 32%. This implies that there is a 90% 
probability that external debt will remain below 41.4% of GDP in the 5
th year, or 
equivalently there is a 10% risk that external debt will exceed 41.4% of GDP in the 5
th year.  
The confidence interval for trade balance / GDP also widens over the projection horizon, 
with 80% of outcomes in the 5
th year within the -3.3% to 3.3% range. 
 
The 80% confidence interval for public debt / GDP widens to 6.7 percentage points in the 5
th 
year, which is substantially narrower than that for external debt / GDP (18.9 percentage 
points). There is a 10% risk that public debt will exceed 58.3% of GDP in the 5
th year, 
starting from an initial level of 55%. Similarly, the confidence interval for the primary fiscal 
balance widens to 2.2 percentage points in the 5
th year, significantly less than that for the 
trade balance (6.7 percentage points). Thus, in the benchmark specification of the model 
there is more variability in the external debt burden and the trade balance than in the public 
debt burden and the primary fiscal balance. 
 
The amount of variability in the public debt burden and the primary fiscal balance is largely 
determined by the fiscal policy rule. The fiscal authority in the model aims to bring the 
public debt level back to target level (55% of GDP) over the long term. The control feedback 
mechanism contains the range of outcomes for public debt burden, at the expense of raising 
the amount of variability in the primary fiscal balance. The exchange rate plays a similar role 
in the external sector (discussed above). The role of the fiscal policy rule and the exchange 
rate will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
 
The stochastic simulation experiments generate probability distributions for all endogenous 
variables in the model. Hence, there is a multitude of economic outcomes that could be 
examined. For the purposes of this paper we focus on probability that the external and public 
debt burdens increase significantly over the five-year projection horizon. This is summarized 
using 90% confidence levels in the 5
th year of the projection. We also examine the amount of 
fiscal effort required to keep the public debt burden from rising over the medium term. This 
is measured using the 90% confidence level for the primary fiscal balance as a percent of 
GDP. Similarly, we examine the amount of external adjustment required to keep the external 
debt burden from rising using the 90% confidence level for the trade balance as a percent of 
GDP.  
 - 16 - 
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B.   Extensions to Emerging Market Economies 
We now add a number of features to the benchmark “advanced country” specification of the 
model to provide insights into why emerging market economies are more vulnerable to 
adverse shocks. First, the model is recalibrated to generate a higher amount of volatility in 
output. We then sequentially add foreign currency denominated debt, an endogenous risk 
premium and sudden stops in capital flows. 
 
Output volatility 
A number of studies that have stressed that output growth has been much more volatile in 
emerging market economies than in advanced economies (Catão and Sutton 2002, Catão and 
Kapur 2004, Kaminsky et al 2004).  Calculations reported by Catão and Kapur (2004) 
indicate that real GDP growth in a sample of 26 emerging market economies has a standard 
deviation of 4.5%, roughly double that for OECD countries.
22 Kaminsky et al (2004) report 
similar results – the standard deviation of real GDP growth in high-middle income countries 
over the period 1960-2003 is about double that in OECD countries (5.9% versus 3.1%). This 
is supported by our own calculations—real GDP growth in a sample of 29 emerging market 
economies has a standard deviation of about 4.1% over the period 1971-2004, almost double 
that in the major advanced (G7) countries (2.2%). 
 
The standard deviation of output growth generated by the benchmark specification of the 
model has a standard deviation of 1.9%. The model is recalibrated by increasing the 
magnitude of the output shocks to the point where the standard deviation of output growth 
doubles (3.8%). Table 2 compares stochastic simulation results obtained using the 
benchmark specification and the recalibrated version of the model (simulations 1 and 2). 
Increasing output volatility raises the amount of variation in each of the four variables of 
interest but has no effect on average outcomes. The public debt burden is more sensitive to 
higher output volatility than is the external debt burden – the 90% confidence level for the 
public debt burden increases by 2.1 percentages points, while that for the external debt 
burden increases by only 0.7 of a percentage point. 
 
                                                 
22 Catão and Kapur (2004) also note that serial defaulters, defined as those emerging market 
economies that have either defaulted or rescheduled debt more than once over the period 
1970-2001, have much higher output volatility than non-defaulters (5.8% versus 4.1%). - 18 - 
Table 2. Stochastic simulation results 
Simulation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 0.00 0.00 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37
External debt / GDP 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0
Risk premium 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Public debt / GDP 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0
Risk premium 0.00 0.00 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52
Simulation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 0.00 0.00 1.37 1.37 1.70 2.08
External debt / GDP 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 31.8 31.1
Risk premium 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.35 4.28
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.65 1.09 1.17
Public debt / GDP 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.5 55.7
Risk premium 0.00 0.00 1.52 1.52 2.01 2.05
Simulation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 3.3 3.7 5.1 4.9 5.1 6.0
External debt / GDP 41.4 42.2 42.3 44.1 43.0 42.0
Risk premium 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.98 7.96
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 1.1 1.7 2.6 3.7 5.8 6.2
Public debt / GDP 58.3 60.4 60.5 63.4 63.9 64.7
Risk premium 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 5.22 5.37
Standard deviation of
real exchange rate 7.44 7.70 7.80 7.09 7.81 8.52
steady-state conditions
average levels in fifth year of projection horizon




Constant risk premium 
Recall that in the benchmark specification of the model there was no risk premium on either 
public or external debt. In simulation 3 we introduce a constant risk premium of 400 basis 
points on external debt, which raises the implicit interest rate on external debt above the rate 
of economic growth (r – g = 4%). A trade surplus of 1.37% of GDP is required to keep 
external debt at 32% of GDP in steady state. The risk premium on external debt also raises 
the cost of servicing public debt because a portion (38%) of public debt is held externally. 
The risk premium averaged across all public debt (held domestically and abroad) is 152 basis - 19 - 
points (38% of 400 basis points). A primary fiscal surplus of 0.65% of GDP is required to 
keep public debt at 55% of GDP in steady state. 
 
The implications of introducing a constant risk premium into the model can be seen by 
comparing results for simulations 2 and 3 reported in Table 2. The risk premium (included in 
simulation 3) has a relatively minor effect on the amount of variation in public and external 
debt, but has a sizeable effect on the trade balance and the primary fiscal balance. The 90% 
confidence level for trade balance increases from 3.7% of GDP to 5.1%, but virtually all of 
the increase is due to the change in steady state conditions – introducing the risk premium 
raises the steady state level of the trade balance from 0% of GDP to 1.37%.  In other words, a 
constant risk premium (more generally, “r-g”) has important implications for the steady-state 
level of the trade balance due to conventional debt accumulation accounting, but has 
relatively minor implications for the amount of stochastic variation. A similar result holds for 
the primary fiscal balance.  
 
Foreign currency denominated debt  
In the benchmark specification of the model all public and external debt are denominated in 
domestic currency. This assumption is appropriate for most advanced countries, but not for 
emerging market economies where external debt is largely denominated in foreign currency 
and in many cases a high proportion of domestic debt is indexed to the exchange rate.
23 We 
consider the case where all external debt and half of the public debt are denominated in 
foreign currency. This is included in simulation 4 reported in Table 2.  
 
Incorporating foreign currency denominated debt into the model has larger effect on the 
public debt than on the external debt. This is because 90% of traded goods (exports and 
imports) in the model are priced in foreign currency, which provides a hedge against 
valuation effects (Hostland and Schembri 2005). A large exchange rate depreciation raises 
the value of external debt significantly (measured in domestic currency), but also raises the 
value of exports significantly (measured in domestic currency), which improves the trade 
balance and offsets the increase in debt service costs. There is no similar hedging mechanism 
for public debt because revenues and expenditures are denominated in domestic currency.  
 
Note that introducing foreign currency denominated debt slightly reduces the amount of 
variation in the trade balance. This counterintuitive result can be explained as follows. The 
valuation effect raises the amount of variability in the external debt burden. This is offset to 
some degree by the exchange rate mechanism, outlined above, which responds to curtail 
deviations in the external debt burden from the initial level. The exchange rate response acts 
to stabilize the trade balance.  
 
                                                 
23 The proportion of public debt indexed to the exchange rate varies greatly across emerging 
market economies and over time. For instance, in the case of Brazil the proportion of 
domestic federal debt held by the public that is indexed to the exchange rate declined from 
23% in December 1999 to almost 4% in May 2005. - 20 - 
Endogenous risk premium  
We introduce an endogenous risk premium into the model by linking investors’ perception of 
default risk to the debt burden. An increase in the debt burden makes investors less certain 
about the government’s “willingness to repay” its debt obligations. A higher perceived risk of 
default gets priced into new issues of debt, which raises debt service costs and thereby adds 
to the debt burden. The model is calibrated such that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
debt burden raises the risk premium by 250 basis points. Hence, a ten percentage point 
increase in the external debt burden would raise the risk premium from 400 to 650 basis 
points. Similarly, a ten percentage point increase in public debt burden would increase the 
risk premium from 152 to 400 basis points. The endogenous risk premium on external debt 
has a 90% confidence level of almost 800 basis points (simulation 5 in Table 2), 400 basis 
points above the steady state level (400 basis points). The endogenous risk premium on 
public debt has a 90% confidence level of 522 basis points, 370 basis points above the steady 
state level (152 basis points). 
 
Endogenizing risk premium into the model (comparing simulations 4 and 5 in Table 2) has a 
large effect on the primary fiscal balance but relatively little effect on the public debt, 
external debt and the trade balance. This is partly due to differences in the maturity structure 
of external and public debt. The maturity structure of public debt is much shorter than that 
for external debt, making the public debt service payments more sensitive to interest rate 
fluctuations. The result is also due to the nature of the fiscal policy rule. The endogenous risk 
premium amplifies the effect of shocks on the public debt burden but the fiscal policy rule 
responds to these fluctuations. Discretionary spending is adjusted such that the debt burden 
reverts back to its initial level over the longer term.  Larger fluctuations in the public debt 
burden require larger adjustments in discretionary spending, which raises the amount of 
variation in the primary fiscal balance.  
 
Note that the endogenous risk premium reduces the amount of variation in the external debt 
burden. This counterintuitive result can be attributed to nonlinear interaction between the 
endogenous risk premium and the exchange rate. An increase in the endogenous risk 
premium raises debt service costs, which increases the external debt burden above the initial 
level. This triggers an exchange rate depreciation which improves the trade balance. The 
improvement in the trade balance more than offsets the higher debt service costs so that the 
current account improves. In other words, higher debt service costs initiate an exchange rate 
response that acts to stabilize the current account and external debt burden. 
 
The probability measures for projections of the fiscal variables are sensitive to the calibration 
of risk premium. To illustrate, we consider an alternative calibration where a ten percentage 
point increase in the debt burden raises the risk premium by 150 basis points (instead of 250 
basis points. The lower response of the risk premium reduces the 90% confidence level for 
the risk premium from 522 to 365 basis points and reduces that for the primary fiscal balance 
from 5.8% of GDP to 4.9%. This suggests that investors’ subjective assessment of default 
risk plays an important role. One interpretation of the empirical findings by Reinhart, Rogoff 
and Savastano (2003) is that the risk premium is more sensitive to increases in the debt 
burden in countries that have defaulted previously and/or have a bad track record in 
maintaining macroeconomic stability. - 21 - 
 
Our analysis assumes that emerging market economies cannot issue debt at yields below the 
“risk-free” rate so that the risk premium cannot be negative.  This assumption introduces an 
asymmetry into the model, which affects the mean outcome of simulated variables. For 
example, the average risk premium on public debt is about 50 basis points above its steady 
state level. Similarly, the average primary fiscal balance is 1.09% of GDP, which is above 
the steady state level 0.65%. The asymmetry raises the average cost of servicing debt and the 
average amount of fiscal effort required to keep the debt burden from rising significantly. 
 
“Sudden stops” in capital flows  
Investors in the model are unwilling to lend when the risk premium exceeds 800 basis points. 
This financing constraint leads to a sudden stop in capital flows, which is accompanied by a 
large exchange rate depreciation to improve the current account. Introducing “sudden stops” 
into the model has large effect on the volatility of the trade balance -- its 90% confidence 
level increases from 5.1% to 6.0% of GDP (simulation 6 in Table 2). However, there is little 
effect on the volatility of the risk premium or the external debt burden. The intuition for this 
finding is as follows. The large exchange rate depreciation improves the trade balance, which 
more than offsets the valuation effect, and therefore stabilizes the external debt burden. The 
higher volatility in the trade balance reflects its role in the external adjustment process that 
stabilizes the debt burden.  
 
Introducing “sudden stops” into the model increases the volatility of the primary fiscal 
balance and the public debt burden. This is due to the valuation effect arising from the 
portion (one half) of the public debt that is denominated in foreign currency. The large 
exchange rate depreciation raises the value of public debt and debt service payments 
(measured in domestic currency), but unlike the case of the external sector, there is no 
offsetting improvement in the primary fiscal balance because fiscal revenues and 
expenditures are denominated in domestic currency.  
 
In order to determine whether our results are sensitive to the way in which sudden stops are 
modeled, we considered an alternative specification of the financing constraint whereby an 
increase in the risk premium above the threshold level (800 basis points) triggers an abrupt 
improvement in the current account.  This entailed imposing the restriction that the current 
account must balance when the financing constraint binds.
24  This roughly corresponds to a 
4.5 percentage point improvement in one year, which is broadly consistent with measures 
used in the empirical literature to define current account reversals.
25 It is also consistent with 
                                                 
24 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) model sudden stop episodes using the same current 
account constraint. Note that in general the magnitude of the current account reversal will 
depend on several factors, including the level of the current account when the finance 
constraint binds, the value of interest and debt maturing, the value of non-debt creating 
capital flows and changes in foreign reserves. 
25 Edwards (2004) considers two definitions of a current account reversal: one where the 
current account improves by at least 4 percentage points in one year; the other where it 
improves by at least 6 percentage points over three years.  - 22 - 
abrupt capital account/current account reversals during recent financial crises.
26 The 
simulation results generated using the current account constraint were found to be quite 
similar to those reported above. This is not surprising because the current account balance 
constraint is attained through a large exchange rate depreciation.
27 In short, there is little 
difference between modeling a sudden stop episode as a constraint on the current account, 
attained through a large exchange rate depreciation, or as a large depreciation, resulting in an 
improvement in the current account. 
 
The results outlined above indicate that the pricing of traded goods and the adjustment of the 
exchange rate to changes in external debt both have a major influence on the sustainability of 
external debt. An exchange rate depreciation results in a rapid improvement in the trade 
balance in our model mainly because traded goods are priced in foreign currency. The 
adjustment largely occurs through trade prices, not volumes. In the case where exports are 
priced in domestic currency, the adjustment largely occurs through trade volumes. The 
empirical evidence indicates that trade volumes adjust more slowly than trade prices. This 
makes the trade balance respond more gradually to exchange rate changes.  
 
To illustrate the importance of trade pricing we compare simulations with exports priced in 
foreign versus domestic currency (simulations 6 and 6a, respectively, reported in Table 3).  
The simulation results indicate that pricing exports in domestic rather than foreign currency 
(simulation 6a versus 6) raises the amount of variability in the trade balance significantly—
its 90% confidence level increases from 6.0% to 7.3% of GDP.  When exports are priced in 
domestic currency, the response of the trade balance to the exchange rate is sensitive to the 
trade price elasticity. The elasticity must be large enough so that an exchange rate 
depreciation improves the current account, otherwise the solvency condition will be 
violated.
28 The solvency condition also depends on several other factors, including the debt 
burden, real interest rates and the growth rate of potential output, all of which are influenced 
by stochastic shocks. Thus, the stability conditions of the model evolve over time as the 
stochastic shocks displace the factors listed above. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) report that capital flows to seven of the largest Latin 
American economies declined from over 5% of GDP in mid-1998 to less than 1% in just one 
year (Figure 2, p. 11); the current account in these countries improved from a deficit at 5% of 
GDP in mid-1998 to almost zero by the end of 2000 (Figure 3, p. 12). 
27 When the current account balance constraint binds, the exchange rate is no longer 
determined by interest rate parity, but instead becomes an endogenous variable to solve the 
model. A large, abrupt depreciation is required to generate a rapid improvement in the 
current account. 
28 This can be thought of in terms of “extended Marshal-Lerner conditions” (Hostland and 
Schembri 2005). - 23 - 
We illustrate the importance of the exchange rate response to changes in external debt, which 
is determined by the following equation: 
 
EtΔqt+1  = (rt – r
f
t ) + θ(Etedebtt+1 - edebt*)          (1)   
 
where EtΔqt+1 is the expected change in the real exchange rate,
29 (rt – r
f
t ) is the domestic – 
foreign real interest rate differential and (Etedebtt+1 - edebt*) is the expected deviation in the 
external debt / GDP ratio from its steady state level. In the case where θ = 0, equation (1) is 
equivalent to an uncovered interest rate parity condition. The results reported for simulation 6 
were generated with θ set to a value of 0.04, implying that a ten percentage point increase in 
the debt burden above the initial level would result in a 4% depreciation of the real exchange 
rate. The exchange rate response acts to stabilize the external sector. This can be 
demonstrated empirically by simulating the model with θ set to 0.02 (instead of 0.04).
30 The 
results, given by simulation 6b, indicate that reducing the exchange rate response raises the 
amount of variability in the trade balance significantly – its 90% confidence level increases 
from 6.0% to 7.0% of GDP.  
 
Note that simulation 6 exhibits higher volatility in the real exchange rate (measured by its 
standard deviation) than simulation 6b, but lower variation in the trade balance. This 
illustrates that it is the nature of the exchange rate volatility, not the magnitude that affects 
the vulnerability of the external sector. 
 
Simulation 6c combines these two factors –exports are priced in domestic currency and the 
exchange rate response is muted. These two factors together amplify the amount of variation 
in the trade balance – its 90% confidence interval increases from 6.0% to 8.4% of GDP. 
Moreover, the incidence of “sudden stops” (episodes where the risk premium exceeds 800 
basis points) increases from 3.8% to 6.3%. 
 
                                                 
29 The nominal exchange rate is defined as the price of foreign exchange so that an increase 
in q implies a depreciation. 
30 The debt insolvency condition is often violated when θ is set to a value lower than 0.02. 
Given our preference not to incorporate debt write-down rules into this stage of research, we 
focus on parameterizations of the model that respect the debt solvency condition.  - 24 - 







Trade balance / GDP 2.08 2.11 2.41 2.53
External debt / GDP 31.1 31.3 31.1 31.4
Risk premium 4.28 4.44 4.43 4.63
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 1.17 1.20 1.38 1.40
Public debt / GDP 55.7 55.7 56.0 55.9
Risk premium 2.05 2.13 2.17 2.26
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 6.0 7.3 7.0 8.4
External debt / GDP 42.0 44.4 44.3 46.8
Risk premium 7.96 8.75 8.80 9.58
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.6
Public debt / GDP 64.7 65.0 64.9 64.9
Risk premium 5.37 5.84 5.77 6.15
Incidence of sudden stops:
5 3.8% 5.1% 4.7% 6.3%
Standard deviation of
real exchange rate 8.52 8.79 7.64 8.51
average levels in fifth year of projection horizon
90% confidence levels in fifth year of projection horizon
         5. Percentage of simulations where sudden stop constraint was binding (risk premium exceeded 800 basis points).
Notes: 1. Exports priced in foreign currency; "full" exchange rate response.
          2. Exports priced in domestic currency.
         4. Exports priced in domestic currency and "muted" exchange rate response




The Public Debt Burden  
Earlier in the paper, we raised the question of whether emerging market economies with 
higher public debt burdens have become more vulnerable to adverse shocks. We examine this 
issue by raising the initial public debt level keeping the external debt burden unchanged 
(implying that the increase in the public debt is financed domestically). 
 
Increasing the initial public debt burden raises the steady-state level of debt service payments 
through two channels. A higher level of debt raises debt service costs through conventional 
debt accounting. It also raises the risk premium for the reasons discussed above, which 
augments debt service costs. A higher primary fiscal balance is required to keep the public 
debt burden constant in steady state. Increasing the initial level of public debt from 55% to 
65% of GDP raises the primary fiscal balance from 0.65% to 2.23% of GDP. Increasing it 
further to 75% of GDP raises the primary fiscal balance to 4.60% of GDP. 
 - 25 - 
The simulation results reported in Table 4 show raising the initial public debt burden from 
55% of GDP to 65% has a significant effect on the amount of variation in the public debt and 
the primary fiscal balance. The 90% confidence level for the public debt burden increases 
from 64.7% to 77.6% of GDP, while that for the primary fiscal balance increases from 6.2% 
to 9.6% of GDP. Much of the increase in the 90% confidence level for the public debt burden 
(10 of the 13 percentage points) simply reflects the higher initial debt level. However, 
conventional debt accumulation accounting can only explain about half of the 3.5 percentage 
point increase in the 90% confidence level for the primary fiscal balance.  
 
When the initial public debt burden is increased to 75% of GDP, the 90% confidence level 
for the public debt rises to almost 90% of GDP, while that for the primary fiscal balance 
increases to 13.7% of GDP. This is a situation where the fiscal constraints are likely to bind, 
implying a high probability of a debt distress episode.  
 
Note as well that raising the initial public debt burden to 75% of GDP has a significant effect 
on average values of the simulated fiscal variables. This is because a higher public debt 
burden makes the model more nonlinear, which amplifies the asymmetric aspect of the risk 
premium. For instance, the risk premium averages almost 50 basis points above its steady 
state level. Similarly, the average level of the simulated primary fiscal balance is 5.3% of 
GDP, 0.7 of a percentage point above its steady state level. To put this into perspective, in 
2004 only 2 out of a sample of 21 emerging market economies ran primary fiscal balances in 
excess of 5% of GDP.
31 This demonstrates that average outcomes from stochastic simulation 
experiments (a dynamic stochastic equilibrium) can deviate significantly from control 
solutions (a dynamic non-stochastic equilibrium). The deviations are larger in cases where 
countries are more vulnerable to adverse shocks because the nonlinearities are greater.   
 
To sum up, the simulation results outlined above indicate that a number of factors have a 
significant effect on the amount of variation in the public debt burden and the primary fiscal 
balance. This raises the question of what the fiscal authority can do to manage these risks. 
 
                                                 
31 This calculation is based on data compiled for September 2005 IMF World Economic 
Outlook. - 26 - 
Table 4. Stochastic simulation results with different levels of initial debt burden 
Debt / GDP 55% 65% 75%
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 1.37 1.37 1.37
External debt / GDP 32.0 32.0 32.0
Risk premium 4.00 4.00 4.00
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 0.65 2.23 4.60
Public debt / GDP 55.0 65.0 75.0
Risk premium 1.52 4.00 6.50
Debt / GDP 55% 65% 75%
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 2.08 2.06 2.10
External debt / GDP 31.1 31.5 31.4
Risk premium 4.28 4.34 4.33
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 1.17 2.86 5.32
Public debt / GDP 55.7 66.1 76.3
Risk premium 2.05 4.28 6.99
Debt / GDP 55% 65% 75%
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 6.0 6.1 6.1
External debt / GDP 42.0 42.0 41.6
Risk premium 7.96 8.50 8.86
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 6.2 9.6 13.7
Public debt / GDP 64.7 77.6 89.9
Risk premium 5.37 8.65 12.13
Standard deviation of
real exchange rate 8.52 8.79 8.89
90% confidence levels in fifth year of projection horizon





C.   The Role of Fiscal Policy  
We examine this issue by simulating the model under alternative fiscal policy rules. The 
purpose of our analysis is not to explain the setting of fiscal policy over the historical period 
but rather to investigate the properties of alternative strategies for fiscal planning under 
uncertainty about future economic and fiscal developments. The fiscal authority seeks to 
keep the public debt burden from rising significantly over the medium term. This entails 
cutting discretionary spending when the debt burden rises above its target level. The scope - 27 - 
for reducing discretionary spending is limited, however. The required fiscal adjustment hence 
runs the risk of having to cut taxes and/or renege on multi-period spending commitments 
(Georges and Moreau 2002a and 2002b). Moreover, cutting spending in response to adverse 
shocks implies a pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance. In sum, the fiscal authority faces a trade-
off between its objective to keep the debt burden from rising significantly and its other 
objectives, namely tax smoothing, honoring multi-period spending commitments and 
economic stabilization (Hostland and Matier 2001, Hemming and Petrie 2002, Perry 2004). 
 
Fiscal Policy Rules 
The fiscal authority in the model strikes a balance between its conflicting policy objectives 
by using a “flexible debt” rule of the form:  
 
(dpbalt - dpbal*) = λ(Etpdebtt+1  -  pdebt*)     (2) 
where dpbalt is the discretionary component of the primary fiscal balance, dpbal* is its steady 
state level, Etpdebtt+1 is the expected level of the public debt in the coming fiscal year, and 
pdebt* is its target level. All variables are expressed as proportions of GDP. The parameter λ 
determines the rate at which the projected public debt burden reverts to its target level in 
response to a shock. A higher value of λ implies a more rapid rate of adjustment, which 
reduces the amount of variation in the debt burden, but increases the amount of variation in 
the primary fiscal balance and results in a more pro-cyclical overall fiscal policy stance.  
The fiscal policy trade off outlined above can be illustrated by the simulation results reported 
in Table 5 below. Simulations 2, 3 and 4 were generated using a flexible debt rule (1) with λ 
set to values of 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. The results indicate that raising λ over the 
range 0.1 to 0.5 improves the degree of debt control – the 90% confidence interval for the 
public debt burden declines from about 70% to 62%, but requires larger fluctuations in the 
primary fiscal balance (as indicated by the 90% confidence level which increases from 5.6% 
to 6.3% of GDP). Note that the fiscal policy rule has a major influence on the risk 
premium—raising λ from 0.1 to 0.5 reduces the 90% confidence interval for the risk 
premium 704 to 462 basis points. This in turn reduces the incidence of sudden stops 
(episodes where the risk premium exceeds 800 basis points) from 5.1% to 3.5%. 
 
A “strict debt rule” (simulation 5) can be considered the extreme case where λ approaches 
infinity. Under this rule the fiscal authority responds to shocks by adjusting discretionary 
spending to a level that brings the projected debt burden back to the target level over the 
coming year. This results in a high degree of debt control—the 90% confidence level for the 
public debt burden is 56.8%, but requires a high degree of flexibility in the primary fiscal 
balance (the 90% confidence level is 7.1% of GDP).  
 
We also consider a more conventional fiscal planning strategy that has received much 
attention in policy debates. Under a “cyclically-adjusted budget balance” rule (simulation 1), 
the fiscal authority aims to keep the overall budget deficit at 4.35% of GDP over the five-- 28 - 
year planning horizon,
32 but does not respond to transitory deviations attributed to business 
cycle fluctuations. This rule is dominated by the flexible debt rule with λ set to 0.3 (or 
higher, 0.5) because it results in less debt control and requires a higher degree of flexibility in 
the primary fiscal balance. This demonstrates the benefit of incorporating both stock and 
flow dimensions into the fiscal planning process. 
 
Table 5. Stochastic simulation results under alternative fiscal policy rules 
Simulations: 1 2 3 4 5
Balanced budget rule Strict debt target
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
External debt / GDP 31.6 31.3 31.1 31.6 31.8
Risk premium 4.45 4.50 4.28 4.27 4.08
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.8
Public debt / GDP 55.6 56.1 55.7 55.4 55.0
Risk premium 2.19 2.35 2.05 1.91 1.55
Balanced budget rule Strict debt target
External debt
Trade balance / GDP 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.4
External debt / GDP 42.1 41.6 42.0 42.4 43.6
Risk premium 8.25 8.79 7.96 7.63 6.95
Public debt
Primary fiscal balance / GDP 6.4 5.6 6.2 6.3 7.1
Public debt / GDP 67.0 69.9 64.7 62.0 56.8
Risk premium 5.98 7.04 5.37 4.62 2.64
Incidence of sudden stops:
1 4.6% 5.1% 3.8% 3.5% 1.3%
Note: 1. Percentage of simulations where sudden stop constraint was binding (risk premium exceeded 800 basis points).
90% confidence levels in fifth year of projection horizon





V.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrates the value of stochastic simulation methods in helping to assess debt 
sustainability in emerging market economies. The stochastic simulation experiments provide 
probability measures for projections of the debt burden over a medium term projection 
horizon, which help in assessing the vulnerability of emerging market economies to adverse 
shocks. Our simulation results indicate that a number of inter-related factors are important, 
including the volatility of output, financial fragility (reliance on short-term, foreign currency 
                                                 
32 This is the steady-state level of the budget balance consistent with a debt/GDP ratio of 
55%. - 29 - 
borrowing), the endogenous response of the risk premium and sudden stops in private capital 
flows.  
 
The factors listed above have a major influence on the vulnerability of public debt; the 
vulnerability of external debt is sensitive to the determination of the exchange rate and to the 
pricing of traded goods. The exchange rate in our model plays an important stabilizing role in 
the external sector. This suggests that exchange rate determination plays a critical role in 
assessing the sustainability of external debt and raises the empirical question of whether 
exchange rates in emerging market economies adjust in such a manner. We view this as an 
important area for future research. Trade pricing also plays a key role in assessing the 
sustainability of external debt. Our results show that pricing exports in foreign currency 
provides a hedge against large exchange rate movements, which stabilizes the external debt 
burden. There is no similar mechanism for the public debt (because fiscal expenditures and 
revenues are denominated in domestic currency).  
 
The results outlined above suggest that the build up in public debt burdens in some emerging 
market economies over the past few years merits close attention going forward. This raises 
the question of what role policy can play to help manage the risks. We show that fiscal policy 
can act in a pre-emptive manner to prevent the debt burden from rising over the medium 
term. However, this requires flexibility in fiscal planning, which many emerging market 
economies lack, given their limited capacity to generate tax revenues, their need for 
investment in public infrastructure and the large proportion of non-discretionary fiscal 
expenditures (particularly on health, education and public pensions). Emerging market 
economies therefore face a difficult trade-off between managing the risk of a public debt 
crisis and other important fiscal policy objectives. This might explain why emerging market 
economies are more prone to episodes of debt distress. We leave this conjecture as another 
important avenue for future research. 
 
Although much of our analysis focuses on fiscal policy, this should not be interpreted to 
imply that fiscal imbalances are the only determinant of debt crises. Several factors omitted 
from our study have played an important role.
33 For example, some debt crises originated in 
banking and corporate sectors, and in many cases later became liabilities of the public 
sector.
34 Explaining the origins of debt crises is clearly beyond the scope of our analysis.  It 
would be of great interest, however, to incorporate contingent liabilities into our analysis of 
fiscal risk. 
 
Our analysis has also omitted elements that reduce the risk of a debt crisis. The large swing 
in current account balances from a deficit to a surplus position over the past five years, along 
with the tremendous build up of foreign reserves has made most emerging market economies 
                                                 
33 Manasse and Roubini (2005) emphasize important differences between debt distress 
episodes.  
34 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) show that liability dollarization in the domestic banking 
sector is a key determinant of sudden stops. - 30 - 
less vulnerable to sudden stops in capital flows. We have also omitted non-debt creating 
capital flows, namely foreign direct investment and portfolio equity, as well as worker 
remittances, which have been significant in many emerging market economies.
35 
Furthermore, capital outflows have increased significantly over the past few years in many 
emerging market economies as they have become more closely integrated with each other 
and with advanced economies. Valuation effects arising from exchange rate movements have 
become more complicated as a consequence. A more extensive analysis is needed to develop 
our understanding of how the various elements mentioned above influence the risk of debt 
default in emerging market economies. 
 
The reduced-form macroeconomic structure underlying our analysis serves to ease the 
computational burden of stochastic simulation methods and facilitate calibration of the 
model. We view this simplification as the first stage of a longer-term research agenda on 
model development. It would be of great interest to extend the analysis to include a well-
defined macroeconomic structure based on a choice-theoretic optimizing inter-temporal 
framework (such as the Global Economy Model (GEM) developed at the Fund). Another 
important advancement would be to endogenize the risk premium in a model-consistent 
manner to improve our understanding of how changes in economic fundamentals influence 
investors’ assessment of risk. Much of our analysis has focused on default risk from the 
perspective of crisis prevention. The methodology followed in the paper can also be applied 
to crisis resolution as well. To do this, one would need to incorporate a rule for resolving 
debt defaults into a stochastic simulation framework. This innovation would enable one to 
develop a more complete assessment of default risk that would include the probability of debt 
default and the expected return given default. One could then derive measures of default risk 
in a model-consistent manner. Moreover, fiscal policy constraints play an important role in 
assessing default risk. In applying DSAs to specific countries one needs to take into account 
fiscal constraints associated with limits on raising tax capacity and reducing non-
discretionary spending, as well as the longer-run growth implications of raising distortionary 
taxes and cutting spending in productive public infrastructure. 
 
This paper has examined debt sustainability with reference to a fictional “generic” emerging 
market economy. For operational purposes, the analysis needs to be tailored to the 
characteristics of individual countries. Part of this is relatively straightforward – our model 
can be easily recalibrated for country-specific values of the public and external debt burdens, 
the maturity structure of public and external debt, the portion of external and public debt 
denominated in foreign currency, etc. Modifying the behavioral parameters to match the 
structural characteristics of individual countries represents a more difficult challenge.  
                                                 
35 In 2004, FDI inflows to all developing countries averaged 2.2% of GDP in 2004, while 
workers’ remittances averaged 1.7% of GDP. - 31 - 
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